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ABIDETH FOREVER? 
GLOBAL USE OF SEMIARID LANDS IN THE INTERWAR YEARS 
]. M. POWELL 
I have undertaken a highly selective Cook's 
Tour in this article, attempting to integrate 
our understanding of semiarid lands around 
the globe. The focus is concentrated on the 
period between the two great wars when new 
nationalisms, old imperial networks, and the 
burgeoning ambitions of scientists combined 
to create new systems of land use in the 
semiarid regions, but a few sorties have been 
made into earlier and later periods to assist the 
interpretation of specific projects. My own 
country, Australia, is used as the starting point 
for the tour, but the influence of American 
Donald Worster's Dust Bowl (1979) will be 
easily discerned. I have argued that the envi-
ronmental and economic crises around the 
world in the interwar years were to some 
extent culturally induced and that they were 
linked by similar assumptions, crossing cultur-
1.M. Powell is reader in geography at Monash 
University in Victoria, Australia. An internation-
ally known scholar on the semiarid lands of the 
world, he has published several books and many 
articles in a wide range of journals, including 
Australian Geographical Studies. 
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al and economic lines, about the potential and 
rationale for settlement in semiarid lands. 
Heavy investment in science and technology, 
multiple ways to manage risk and indebted-
ness, and expansions of the scale of Western-
style capitalistic farming in semiarid areas were 
typical of capitalist economies, but consider-
ation is also given to developments in semiarid 
regions characterized by communist and 
mixed economies. 
The whirlwind nature of my tour has 
forced the exclusion of some details and 
ambiguities: I have asked, instead, if decisions 
about the management of these many different 
regions were developed within the region as a 
result of experience or outside the region in 
response to planners' hopes for the society as a 
whole. Thus a nationalist or imperialist rhetor-
ic is counterposed to the empirical findings of 
scientists and settlers committed to a particular 
place and personally witness to the stringencies 
of a particular semiarid environment. Symbol-
ic of cultural determinism, implicit in the 
following interpretations, is the case of Griffith 
Taylor, the founding father of academic geog-
raphy in Australia. His writings on environ-
mental limitations to settlement and 
agricultural production were angrily banned 
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by boosters who preferred to believe, with 
Arctic explorer Vilhjalmur Stefansson, that 
"the worthlessness of any large territory is 
imaginary ... Such a territory is worthless 
simply because people insist on thinking it so" 
(Powell 1980). 
Let me set the scene. First, there were 
extensive semiarid plains in both hemi-
spheres-the grasslands, pampas, prairies, sa-
vannas, steppes, and the great alluvial or 
"riverine" plains. During the period between 
the world wars, the influential sections of some 
communities were obsessed with Lebensraum, 
ecumene, and national self-sufficiency, and they 
considered the plains environments relatively 
underused. Second, there were quantum leaps 
in scientific and technological information in 
the early twentieth century, and the efforts of 
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some individuals and groups to coordinate and 
synthesize these developments were distinctive 
characteristics of the interwar years. The 
scientists' hopes for accelerated social reform 
and economic development found appropriate 
tasks on the semiarid frontiers. Third, in 
China and in the U.S.S.R. science was to be 
harnessed to revolutionary change as the 
peasant modes of settlement were replaced by 
collectives and state farms. Semiarid country 
was again prominently in focus. Fourth, 
though historians have argued that peasant 
cultivators and herders in the communist 
world paid the highest price for changes during 
this period, heavy costs were also levied on the 
semiarid plains of advanced, developing, and 
less developed countries within the Western 
sphere of influence. 
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FIG. 1. Simplified average annual rainfall map for Australia, showing state boundaries and capital 
cities. 
RANCHERS AND NOMADS: AUSTRALIA 
Leading a decrepit one-eyed horse, a lonely 
boy scarcely into his teens moved quietly out 
of his Adelaide home. His destination was the 
Barrier Range in the Corner Country of New 
South Wales-specifically, the Poolamacca 
Station, where his brother George lived. 
George found him dubious employment with a 
landless bushman who lived close to nature 
and beyond the law, moving his stock around 
the unfenced properties on that wide frontier. 
The youth learned other bush skills from his 
native companions and over the years his 
involvement in carting, coaching, droving, 
and meat supply made him widely known in 
isolated mining and grazing communities. By 
the time he was thirty years old, his coaching 
business covered western New South Wales 
and parts of Western Australia; he was supply-
ing his own horses to this trade and was 
beginning to provide remounts for the British 
Army in India. By the outbreak of the Great 
War his business had survived droughts and 
depressions and floods, and he controlled 
numerous farms and stations, mainly cattle 
country, that exceeded in area the whole of 
England. 
The boy was Sidney Kidman (1857-1935), 
the future "cattle king." The supremely inde-
pendent, opportunistic Kidman conceived a 
brilliant management strategy in response to 
the outback challenge-he developed great 
chains of carefully located properties reaching 
from the remotest northwestern corner of 
Australia to the Flinders Ranges, in striking 
distance of the Adelaide market. An oblique 
line directly drawn some two thousand kilome-
ters across the continent gives some impression 
of the scale of operations: Kidman linked his 
interests in the monsoonal country bordering 
the Gulf of Carpentaria with others in the 
backcountry of western Queensland and New 
South Wales, thereby picking up the chances 
offered by occasional southerly flows in the 
Georgina and Diamantina rivers, and down 
the Coopers Creek district into South Austra-
lia. It was an aggressive stroke, seemingly an 
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uninhibited application of the lessons of the 
nomads' flexibility and opportunism to Kid-
man's own relentless search for profit. His 
empire included agencies in each of the capital 
cities and in some of the provincial towns, 
with any number of interlocking companies 
and partnerships to bamboozle the most 
efficient taxation inspector. In the 1930s he 
owned or had an interest in a huge amount of 
land, variously estimated at between 126,000 
and 170,000 square kilometers. 
In its major emphases Kidman's approach 
to land management was at once innovative 
and traditional. Although it was highly indi-
vidualistic it was also built on broader conven-
tional wisdom derived over generations of 
aboriginal settlement. And, despite his ulti-
mate achievements, Kidman did not escape 
the hazards endemic to the inland: although 
the great drought of 1902 punished most of his 
neighbors far more severely, it nearly brought 
him to his knees, and his empire, though not 
destroyed, was broken up during the 1925-32 
drought. 
PROBLEMS OF TENURE 
Kidman's pastoral kingdom was built on 
judiciously selected leaseholds. Indeed, it was 
the leasing principle that had provided the 
framework for most semiarid and arid land 
settlement in Australia since the middle of the 
nineteenth century-and that remains domi-
nant today. These leasehold tenures have 
resulted from dynamic interchanges between 
official and popular evaluations of land in a 
dramatically unpredictable climate. Own-
ership rests ultimately in the Crown-that is, 
in the community at large, politically rep-
resented at federal and state levels-and the 
leasing arrangements declare rights and re-
sponsibilities regarding such items as the 
length of tenure, the size of the holding, 
amount of rental expected, types of enterprise 
and permitted stock-carrying capacities, and 
even a few directions relating to the required 
backgrounds and qualifications of leasehold-
ers. Therefore, the leasehold is a living docu-
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ment incorporating the product of official-
popular interplay at any moment in fat, lean, 
and indifferent times. 
The frontier pastoralists frequently acted in 
advance or in open defiance of their govern-
ments, and their pioneer adaptations helped to 
shape the evolving leasehold arrangements. 
They stocked heavily in the good seasons and 
generally strove to hold on to as large an area 
as possible in an attempt to contain the effects 
of localized droughts; their experience gradual-
ly enabled them to recognize the unpredictable 
nature of the resource base, and they were 
persuaded toward the commonsensical adapta-
tion of high levels of temporal and spatial 
mobility. In marked contrast, until the late 
interwar period, the consuming concern of 
state and federal authorities was to intensify 
the occupation of all the marginal lands, and 
they abandoned that position with reluctance. 
How BIG Is A HOMESTEAD? 
Because official viewpoints were naturally 
influenced by the powerful urban interests, 
some of the most enduring contributions to 
the leasehold as a structural adjustment to 
marginality came in the form of a wider 
diffusion of the "welfare state" ideal. The most 
telling example was the direct incorporation of 
the notion of "living areas" or "maintenance 
areas" into the land legislation of certain 
states. The major problem was in defining the 
area required to support a family unit. It was 
difficult enough to find agreement on an 
"average family" or on expectations of a 
reasonable "standard of living." The selection 
of a reliable measuring stick was no easier. The 
capacity to carry a specified minimum number 
of stock per holding, or merely the area of the 
holding, variously found favor. Debates on 
these issues focused on the differences between 
experiential and theoretical understandings of 
the environment. Competent local and region-
al inventories are obviously needed and, 
accordingly, there has always been significant 
potential for the forceful presentation of 
popular claims confidently based on familiar 
statistical and other evidence. In New South 
Wales and Queensland the early efforts of the 
authorities were directed toward restricting the 
maximum sizes and ensuring a defined mini-
mum area for individual pastoralists. Govern-
ments consistently argued for a progressive 
intensification of settlement despite uncertain-
ties, thus by implication admitting their re-
sponsibility to settlers. 
Early official definitions of homestead 
maintenance areas in semiarid New South 
Wales favored nine square miles (5,760 acres) 
in 1883; at the end of the century preferences 
oscillated between a doubling of the previous 
standard and a measure based on proven 
carrying capacities ranging from 4,000 to 8,000 
sheep or sheep equivalents, depending mainly 
on climatic conditions. Queensland was more 
generous, sanctioning 20,000 acres in 1897 and 
increasing this to 40,000 and 60,000 acres for 
the drier west a few years later. Living areas in 
each state continued to increase. In New 
South Wales after 1938 the living standard of 
the land, as well as the people, was to be taken 
into account-safeguards for the preservation 
of soil and vegetation were written into the 
leasing provisions. Queensland's 1927 Act 
allowed the necessity of sufficient land to offer 
a "reasonable reserve" or cushion during the 
droughts, and after World War II individuals 
were permitted to obtain chains of leaseholds 
where it could be shown that they were to be 
run as a risk-spreading unit taking maximum 
advantage of environmental diversity. Lessons 
learned by the pastoralists themselves usually 
provided most of the legislators' cues, and 
adjustments to leasehold structures frequently 
owed something to a collective politicization of 
Australia's graziers. 
OTHER ADJUSTMENTS TO THE LAND 
Australian graziers and government offi-
cials learned from their mistakes. They also 
learned from the widespread results of empiri-
cal testing or "folk experimentation" in Aus-
tralia's marginal environments, notably in the 
late-nineteenth century advance-retreat se-
quence of wheat farming in South Australia's 
northern district beyond Goyder's Line. How-
ever, some mistakes were repeated. In the 
absence of freehold rights, users may choose to 
continue environmentally destructive prac-
tices in search of short-term profit. Errors in 
official management policies may teach land 
users to doubt the authorities' wisdom and to 
milk government agencies for part of the 
financial backing needed to attempt the kind 
of geographical diversification practiced by 
Kidman. Nor were the decisions always made 
by individuals. At various periods, companies 
and partnerships have been more common 
than individual family holdings, and of course 
the banks have held immense tracts from time 
to time. 
Only the sheer immensity of his operations 
distinguished Sidney Kidman's audacious strate-
gies from thousands of more modest ones. From 
the middle of the nineteenth century, in grain 
and grazing regions alike, settlers made stren-
uous efforts to achieve official sanction for 
larger minimum areas while simultaneously 
maneuvering to obtain their own more viable 
units, even in defiance of the law, and notably 
in combination with family members or neigh-
bors. The resulting mosaic of fragmented units 
was more characteristic than the compact 
blocks sketched out by the legislators. 
While management of land itself progressed 
in. a variety of legal and extra-legal fashions, 
management of distance was accomplished by 
official and private cooperation. The good 
economic sense of droving was not easily 
shaken; it remained a uniquely Australian 
institution, variously romanticized. In the 
inter-war period a myriad of "travelling stock 
routes" in every state guaranteed graziers 
public access at nominal fees. Many routes 
remain today, despite the recent rapid intro-
duction of road transport, and their estimated 
total area of over ten million acres provides 
critical supplementary reserves during the 
droughts (McKnight 1977). In the nineteenth 
century, camels successfully replaced horse 
teams and bullocks over wide areas, and the 
telegraph and later the telephone and radio 
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blessedly reduced the sense of isolation. Educa-
tion by correspondence was encouraged in the 
early twentieth century by such technologies; 
even the humble bicycle brought a degree of 
local and regional emancipation and increased 
the spatial competitiveness of mobs of itiner-
ant shearers and other rural workers (fitzpat-
rick 1980). Health care also came to the 
outback. Beginning in 1911, Bush Nursing 
Associations provided autonomous and self-
contained medical care for isolated rural 
communities too small to support their own 
doctors. Similarly, the Flying Doctor Service, 
which is currently government-supported and 
registers over 100,000 consultations annually, 
began in 1927 as part of the Presbyterian 
Church's Australian Inland Mission. 
These valued Australian adjustments 
mainly developed in situ within a relatively 
advanced and homogeneous white population 
that is still disadvantaged by isolation (Avery 
et al. 1980; Lonsdale and Holmes 1981). By the 
1930s the aboriginal community formed a 
minuscule residual, largely concentrated on 
outback reserves or as workers on pastoral 
stations. Despite their small numbers, their 
extraordinary skills as all round stockmen were 
significant in the cattle regions on the arid 
fringes; their co-option as underpaid workers 
was one of the more exploitative adaptations 
developed by bigger British and Australian 
leaseholders. At least those native people 
survived, after a fashion, in the dominant 
white society. They and their grandchildren 
have been pressing the case for a better deal 
over recent years, with such effect that they 
now hold far more inclusive rights over some 
large semiarid areas than any whites have been 
able to obtain. 
PASTORALISM IN ASIA AND AFRICA 
Elsewhere in the world traditional pastoral 
nomads continued to be subjected to intrusive 
"modernizing" forces throughout the interwar 
years. For example, the peoples of Outer 
Mongolia, who could boast their own distinc-
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tive heritage of imperial activities, had become 
locked between China and Russia and depen-
dent on both. Surrounded by revolution in 
the only world they knew, they were soon 
easily conquered and effectively brought with-
in the Soviet empire. Their active and passive 
resistance to the collectivization plans of 
Stalinist Russia weakened the ancient econom-
ic and social base, precipitating disruption that 
stymied planners for thirty-five years. 
Western-style imperialism in Africa in the 
period between the world wars was even more 
damaging, insofar as its consequences have 
resonated down the years to plague today's 
independent African states. Stereotyped 
images of the pastoral Masai, for instance, 
were partly manufactured in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries by competing 
Europeans who described them as living 
anachronisms-inefficient and careless users of 
the land who held cattle for reasons of status 
and were culturally resistant to the market-
place and other innovations. Such fictions and 
exaggerations encouraged attempts to replace 
their pastoral ways by more modern practices. 
Yet in the 1930s and 1940s the Masai success-
fully marketed large numbers of cattle, includ-
ing scores of thousands to an enterprising 
meat-canning firm, and they had developed 
admirable social and ecological adaptations to 
cope with their difficult environments. Fur-
thermore, these were enlightened, rationally 
based adjustments, maintaining an emphasis 
on mutual aid and cooperation and including 
strong sanctions to curb inefficient uses. Such 
a well-tried ethical system provided a valuable 
but long-neglected indigenous base for sensi-
tive and sustained development programs. 
Even in our own times misleading testimony 
from tourist interests has criticized Masai 
herders for competing with valuable wild 
animals, when there is good ecological evi-
dence that the long-grass preference of their 
cattle improves many habitats. As this exam-
ple shows, the presumptuous importation of 
ethnocentric planning strategies may be inef-
fective or destructive in traditional societies 
(Bates and Lofchie 1980). 
CONFLICTS BETWEEN EXPERTS 
Despite the evidence that pastoralists were 
living successfully in the semiarid lands of the 
globe before World War I, the emphasis of 
nationally and globally oriented planners was 
toward agricultural development. In June 1924 
a strange group of high-caste dudes proceeded 
into the enigmatic interior of Australia in a 
caravan of Dodge cars. Their leader was the 
Canadian Arctic explorer and adventurer 
Vilhjamur Stefansson, and their purpose was 
to garner support for the idea that Australia's 
"empty" spaces could be settled by whites and 
that this-considering comparisons based on 
land area alone-could turn Australia into a 
rival of the United States in power and 
population. Stefansson had already discussed 
northern expansion with Canada's prime 
minister, Sir Robert Borden. Now, at the 
invitation of Australia's influential boosters, 
he was ready to take on that continent. 
Stefansson's favored theme was well estab-
lished in Australia's newspapers before his 
outback jaunt began. Reminding readers of the 
curious misperception of the "Great American 
desert," he assured them that human ingenui-
ty was paramount and that no desert-hot or 
cold, real or supposed-could defeat a civilized 
people with modern science at their disposal. 
His glowing reports from the "expedition" 
bases fell like a rain of confidence on the 
shriveled consciences of leading Australians. 
In opposition was geographer Griffith 
Taylor, whose aggressive writings on climatic 
controls in agricultural production and more 
generally on the severe environmental limita-
tions on future white settlement were by no 
means confined to the professional journals. 
Taylor had deliberately set out to debunk the 
boosters. For more than a decade he had 
exposed and ridiculed the naive promotion of 
"Australia Unlimited." Using elementary re-
source inventories and latitudinal analogies, 
he predicted a total population of about 
nineteen or twenty million by the end of the 
century. Stefansson's tour was clearly intended 
as a direct challenge to Taylor, who promptly 
replied with a far more detailed field investiga-
tion of the inner margins of settlement around 
the continent. In the ensuing furore the 
uncompromising Taylor was widely disowned 
as "unpatriotic," a "croaking pessimist," and, 
ultimately, an "environmental determinist." 
The episode appears to confirm the perva-
siveness of various types of colonial dependen-
cy. Australia's "underused" capacities had 
been promoted in a long succession of Imperial 
Conferences. Above all, the Dominions Royal 
Commission (1912-17) had suggested a special 
status for Australia in a "revivified" British 
Empire, a strengthened union that was to be 
distinguished by any number of real and 
assumed linkages and priorities based on 
economic, military, political, and racial argu-
ments. The Commission emphasized the ne-
glected benefits of enduring sentimental ties 
between Britain and the old (and of course 
white) Dominions, and inevitably a connection 
was unashamedly drawn in some quarters 
between this notion and the supremacy of 
"Anglo-Saxonism. " 
Resource inventories of each of the major 
Dominions and various imperial "possessions" 
were called for to determine ways of reducing 
the dependence on foreign suppliers. Britain 
was said to be crowded, overpopulated; in 
contrast the Dominions were indeed "empty," 
and so the principle of complementary needs 
and aspirations seemed obvious. The inaugu-
ration of an Australian federal government in 
1901 had intensified nationalism on the conti-
nent. Australians worried about their small 
and predominantly urban population, with a 
country-wide average density of scarcely more 
than one white inhabitant per square mile. It 
was said that settlement of the interior prom-
ised to increase productivity and enhance 
national security, and even-in terms similar 
to those used by Frederick Jackson Turner for 
the United States-contribute to the devel-
opment of a distinctly Australian national 
character. Queensland, Western Australia, 
and the Northern Territory, immense and self-
consciously young regions of the new Com-
monwealth, clamored for development. Labor 
ABIDETH FOREVER? 157 
unions were suspicious of immigration in 
general because they feared more competition 
among workers, but they favored settlement 
schemes that would build domestic markets. 
Expansion into new areas also decreased the 
need to intensify settlement in the older 
districts near the coasts, a demand that had 
put state governments at odds with their 
substantial landowners. All of these popular 
nationalist ideas were congruent with the new 
imperialism, and the two strains of thought 
combined in widespread public enthusiasm. 
In opposition stood Griffith Taylor. His 
relentless insistence on regional or national 
controls might have struck a more sympathetic 
chord if he had balanced it with closely 
textured local analyses, which could not have 
failed to admit actual and potential human 
achievements. At that juncture the Austra-
lians were accustomed to local environmental 
evaluations, at both the public service and folk 
experimentation levels. That kind of specificity 
would have made a more promising platform 
for the promotion of geography in the "new" 
education, but Taylor chose to make his stand 
on "national issues" and "nation-planning." 
His geography textbook on Australia was 
banned by Western Australian education 
authorities because of its embarrassing employ-
ment of the hated terms desert and aridity, yet 
he persisted in his declaration of a relatively 
modest national ecumene. Vilified on all sides, 
Taylor resigned his Sydney appointment in 
1928 to take up a position at the University of 
Chicago. 
INFLUENCE OF IMMIGRATION 
Another expression of imperial optimIsm 
was the Empire Settlement Act of 1922, which 
allowed the British government to support 
development programs and pioneer settlement 
schemes in the Dominions, facilitating emigra-
tion by paying passages and providing training 
and initial living allowances. Ecstatic publicists 
insisted that this might bring about 450,000 
British immigrants to Australia over the next 
decade, but for the most part the legislation 
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brought only further confusion. The failure of 
sponsored schemes in Western Australia, 
Victoria, and New South Wales became 
obvious before the end of the 1920s. Worse, 
most of the state legislatures had engaged in an 
imprudent rush for the "cheap money," and a 
hard-won conservatism in rural settlement 
policy and practice was crushed by a national-
ist-imperialist enthusiasm that justified the 
opening up of virgin land on the drier margins 
and the subdivision of hundreds of big prop-
erties used for livestock and wheat production. 
This initiative brought a number of people, as 
yet uncounted, to areas of proven hardship. 
Many were new to farming, and most were 
unaccustomed to semiarid conditions; some 
were certainly new to both and to Australia. 
The wider Australian community's expecta-
tions of more productivity from marginal areas 
placed a special burden on the settlers, since 
the pioneers' reliance on the governments' 
provision of a generous array of credit facilities 
made it easy for others to stereotype them as 
quasi-mendicants. 
SCIENTISM AND THE WELFARE STATE 
During the interwar years, planners 
around the globe invested high hopes in 
science and particularly in the "new" science of 
ecology. New Deal scientists in the United 
States seemed to have a chance to produce a 
coordinated program of conservation drawing 
on expertise from many disciplines, but instead 
they drew up a number of discrete sets of 
recommendations. "Perhaps," Donald Worster 
writes, "that is where reliance on scientific 
experts inevitably must lead" (Worster 1979, 
198). Of the American scientists who pro-
moted the role of ecology in public planning, 
possibly the best known internationally were 
Frederic Clements and Paul Sears. They 
combined to make an urgent case for scientific 
leadership on the plains of the United States, 
with Sears explaining that scientists were 
already deeply involved in developing the 
British Empire's resources. The irascible Kan-
sas historian James Malin correctly divined 
that such scientific managers were threats to 
the myths of "statism" and scientism erected 
by the prevailing economic culture to limit 
American freedom, but few ecologists had the 
time or the inclination to follow their creed to 
a full critique of American ways of life and 
remained firmly planted in the universities and 
colleges. They offered their expert advice to 
the planners, "then backed off from the job" 
(Worster 1979, 209)-avoiding the martyrdom 
suffered by Griffith Taylor. 
THE U .S.S.R AND CHINA 
A harder rationalism introduced agrarian 
communism in the U.S.S.R. and in China. By 
1928 about 25 million peasant holdings, aver-
aging 37 acres each, existed in the Soviet 
Union. Cossacks, wealthier peasants, semi-
nomadic Kazahks, and others bitterly opposed 
their collectivization, destroying their own 
crops and livestock. Some peasants did ap-
prove of the movement; and by 1940, after a 
great deal of suffering, about 97 percent (75 
million) were based on 235,000 collectives, 
with the remainder scattered over remote 
districts. During the early phases of collectivi-
zation, planners claimed that communization 
approached a return to traditional village life. 
Such rationalizations disguised the single-
mindedness of the mission but were congruent 
with what was probably an equivalent under-
statement of the productivity of the original 
peasant system. Economics of scale permitted 
greater mechanization on the collectives, to-
gether with a more efficient deployment of 
technical and scientific expertise. The state 
farm, in which the workers were government 
employees, became a favored alternative after 
World War II and was significant in the 
pioneering of new methods and new regions. 
A rapid amalgamation of the old collectives 
and the transformation of some of them into 
state farms roughly equalized the numbers of 
both types by the early 1980s (Shaffer 1977; 
Stuart 1983). 
One implication of the state farms is that 
man can overcome nature and imprint the 
directives of a central authority on the land-
scape. In the late 1950s, state farms spear-
headed a massive entry into Kazakhstan, 
western Siberia, and other previously intract-
able semiarid plains, inspiring the Chinese to 
begin agricultural expansion into their own 
dry north (Pannell and Ma 1983; Yao 1968). 
Westerners have had difficulty in assessing 
these actlvltles because the outlines are 
obscured by a context of stubborn regional 
preferences and the planners' expectations of 
agricultural support for favored industrial 
programs. Although the Soviet and Chinese 
expansions fall outside the period between the 
world wars, the similarities to what was 
happening elsewhere in those years, particular-
ly in terms of regional preference, scientific 
imperative, and centralized planning, are in-
structive. China's expeditions into "virgin 
land" between 1958 and 1965 called upon the 
earth sciences to counteract the water imbal-
ance between north and south China (Chung 
1968). But in the United States-the very 
country that had fostered advanced soil sci-
ence between the wars-economic ambition 
and difficult seasons won out over science and 
planning, combining to aggravate six years of 
wind erosion that severely damaged over 
twelve million acres of sown land, leading to 
the abandonment of most of it for farming. 
CONTRIBUTIONS OF SCIENCE: AUSTRALIA 
If science failed to restrain ambition in the 
United States, it did prove "subversive" to 
non-British cultures in the British Empire, 
especially when mixed with ignorance of other 
cultures. In order to understand this phenome-
non, let us begin by returning to Australia. 
Australia used science in the public service 
during the twentieth-century expansion of the 
grazing and wheat frontiers, but science did 
not always give reliable answers. While a 
holistic view appealed for a time to Australia's 
botanists, it did not produce successful range 
management strategies, particularly because 
there was no unequivocal evidence that the 
range vegetation had markedly deteriorated 
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everywhere, despite generations of opportunis-
tic grazing. By the later 1930s, some scientists 
were apparently converted to the folk wisdom 
that described vastly more dynamic vegetation 
communities-there was at best a "fluctuating 
climax," which therefore offered successions of 
good and bad seasons. The enthusiastic appli-
cation of dry farming principles in Australia's 
wheat belts also produced sporadic results. 
Twenty years or more before the development 
of sophisticated dry farming in the United 
States, wheat farmers in southeastern Austra-
lia had established varying degrees of reliance 
on fallowing techniques, but in the early years 
of this century a. veritable dry farming cult 
mushroomed after leading politicians and 
bureaucrats returned from a study tour in 
North America (Williams 1974; Powell 1976). 
The subsequent unreserved application of 
American practices to much drier regions in 
Australia was an unusual example of official 
and popular accord-but one that led directly 
to catastrophic soil erosion, with related 
bankruptcies and abandonments. A similar 
example is provided in the half-century lag 
between British scientists' proof of the value of 
superphosphate as a fertilizer and its adoption 
in Australia. Despite the efforts of agricultural 
research stations and the evangelistic efforts of 
]. D. Custance of South Australia's Rose-
worthy College, public opinion remained 
hostile to such "book learning" until two 
ordinary farmers made independent experi-
ments using small amounts of the fertilizer in 
conjunction with American seed-drilling 
equipment. That was the spur and, at last, 
official disseminating agencies successfully 
marketed the idea-so began Australia's de-
pendence on superphosphate. 
In her study of the northern Great Plains, 
Mary Hargreaves (1957) explained that conser-
vatism among agricultural scientists may have 
limited the impact of their work. In Australia 
the comparative dearth of the educational and 
research institutions where such scientists 
work had a positive as well as a negative side. 
Homegrown practical solutions-or ideas that 
appeared to be homegrown-frequently had 
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maximum effect. Pioneers used their own 
enterprising clearing and plowing devices 
across Australia's southeastern states. Long 
before the discovery of Mendelian principles of 
genetics, a Cambridge-educated immigrant, 
the former surveyor William James Farrer, 
toiled alone in the backcountry of New South 
Wales to breed varieties of wheat. Farrer later 
worked with Department of Agriculture chem-
ist F. B. Guthrie and before World War II 
dozens of their new strains-commercially 
viable, early maturing and therefore both 
drought-tolerant and rust-escaping-domi-
nated the Australian wheat industry and were 
used by international correspondents. In its 
immediate utilitarian relevance this cooper-
ation was one of the best kinds of adaptation. 
Government departments of agriculture had 
sponsored similarly novel programs over the 
years, and accommodated a few highly gifted 
individuals, but they remained essentially 
administrative agencies charged with the diffu-
sion of existing knowledge rather than original 
research. 
The Australian scientific community oper-
ated with a number of handicaps during the 
interwar years. Funds were meager. Distances 
prevented specialists in the same field from 
conferring regularly with each other. Universi-
ties were small and few, and most academics 
who were not swamped with teaching were 
preoccupied with achieving "international" 
(i.e., non-Australian) recognition in their field. 
Even when the Australian government estab-
lished the Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) in 1926, Prime Minister 
Stanley Melbourne Bruce and other leaders 
expected it to serve as a kind of conduit for the 
transfer of British science to Australia. Al-
though the politicians and bureaucrats, accept-
ing client status within the empire, brought 
British experts on visits to set down research 
guidelines, this flurry of activity failed to 
consolidate the old traditions of dependency. 
This deliberately overstates the case for the 
development of scientific nationalism in Aus-
tralia, but an explanation of these underlying 
tensions is necessary for understanding the 
role of science in helping Australians adapt to 
semiarid grasslands and savannas. In the early 
years of the CSIR, T. B. Robertson, a graduate 
of Adelaide University with long postgraduate 
and professional experience in physiology and 
biochemistry in the United States, proposed a 
program of fundamental research on the 
connections between animal nutrition and 
wool and meat production. David Rivett, chief 
executive of CSIR, probably gave the nod to 
this attractive lead program because it prom-
ised exciting research exemplars. In Britain, 
however, Robertson's experiments were heavi-
ly criticized-not only on pure scientific 
grounds but also by those who sought or 
claimed an imperial monopoly and thought 
the Australian should concentrate on the 
adaptation of existing knowledge to local 
conditions. He steadfastly declined to act as a 
mere laboratory assistant. 
Grossly overworked, Robertson died at 
forty-five, but his successors were inspired by 
his stand and soon moved on to clarify 
important interdependencies between agro-
stology (botany of grasses), soil chemistry, 
biochemistry, and physiology. Their research 
demonstrated the significance of trace element 
deficiencies in regional soils, first with the 
dramatic discovery of cobalt deficiency in 
calcareous coastal districts and later with the 
discovery of copper, zinc, molybdenum, and 
selenium deficiencies, the correction of which 
augmented the grazing potential of every state. 
The development of vaccines for black sheep 
disease in sheep and pleuropneumonia in 
cattle also exemplified a distinctively utilitari-
an Australian science, though the Empire 
Marketing Board and the Pasteur Institute in 
Paris contributed to this effort. Economic 
entomology, a new field in the 1920s, proved 
to be a particularly good area for demonstrat-
ing Australia's independent national effort in 
applied science. Scientists achieved spectacular 
results in biologically controlling the prickly 
pear, an introduced plant pest that was 
invading thousands of square miles of pasture-
land in Queensland and New South Wales, by 
introducing Cactoblastis cactorum, a natural 
predator. This triumph won the scientists 
further security within Australia and encour-
aged the pursuit of additional fundamental 
research without resort to any cap-in-hand 
apologia. 
The launching of the CSIR's division of 
economic entomology in 1928 resulted in the 
design of ambitious programs to counter rabbit 
and locust plagues and to control major 
pasture weeds and the sheep blowfly. The 
1930s depression brought a fresh influx of 
funds to the CSIR's applied research teams: a 
prominent example was the decision of the 
Australian Wool Board, created in 1936, to 
support the CSIR and not the university 
departments. Unfortunately, after 1945 politi-
cal pressures as well as the lure of private 
industry and "big science" enticed gifted 
individuals away from public service and 
hampered CSIR research. We know too little 
about the role of science in the Australian 
polity to do more than begin a comparison of 
Australian and American experiences in agri-
cultural research. Possibly, more of Australia's 
applied scientists became lost in their own 
version of the bureaucratic machine, or there 
may have been smaller representations of 
highly competent scientists and technologists 
in senior positions in our service agencies. 
Certainly absent were individuals like Hugh 
Hammond Bennett, an excellent publicist and 
political tactician who guided America's Soil 
Conservation Service through the thirties and 
forties. A detailed history of the CSIR 
(CSIRO) will soon be published, and it may 
disclose the extent to which its leaders were 
drawn to opposing models in the foundation 
years of boom and depression-to academia's 
staid departmental structures or to more 
flexible, mission-oriented frame works. (But 
that history may in itself show the influence of 
American commentaries on Australian histori-
cal researchers-cf. McDean 1983; Hall 1983; 
Peterson 1980). 
SETTLEMENT AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
In comparison with the situation in other 
parts of the New World, the social sciences in 
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Australia remained underdeveloped and un-
derconsulted. Yet the payment of society's 
"debt of honor" to returning war veterans by 
land settlement seemed to be obvious and 
natural to both Australians and Canadians, 
and offered a role for social sciences. About 
seventy thousand veterans and their families 
were involved in settlement schemes in the 
plains of both countries. In Canada federal 
government controls and the application of 
rural sociology models were stronger. In Aus-
tralia nationalistic and imperialistic sentiments 
permeated most of the schemes, and high 
levels of emotionalism, along with the well-
meaning but frequently muddled activities of 
local patriotic associations, did little to pro-
mote rational planning measures. A shaky 
partnership between Australia's federal and 
state authorities led to a diffusion of settlement 
over dry and irrigated estates and individual 
small farms and to unfortunate divisions of 
responsibility among local, state, and federal 
authorities and a host of voluntary agencies. 
The Australian confusion was understand-
able. A very young nation of about five million 
souls suffered 60,000 dead and more than 
100,000 other casualties, proportionally more 
than any other empire country. Approxi-
mately 250,000 discharged soldiers had to be 
reinstated in civilian life. In the rush to find a 
solution, elementary economic and environ-
mental appraisals were forgotten and agricul-
tural research, marketing strategies, and farm 
training programs received little consideration. 
Settled on high-cost lands in confident times, 
within less than a decade the veterans were 
struggling with prohibitively high mortgages 
and production costs as world commodity 
prices were falling. By the late 1920s, thou-
sands were declared "failed. " Yesterday's 
heroes, they were mown down at last by 
mismanagement, relentless economic pres-
sures, droughts, and floods-and by a marked 
reversal of the previous goodwill shown alike 
by lands administrators and the wider commu-
nity. The gap between yeomen and bu-
reaucrats-that vital barrier to the dialogue 
required for secure adaptation-widened 
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again. The federal government was obliged to 
intervene to adjust loans and farm sizes around 
the country, another small step toward cen-
tralization in Australian affairs. Even so, there 
was remarkably little empathy with those 
veterans who obviously found it agonizingly 
difficult to complete their rehabilitation on 
Australia's lonely backblocks. The psychologi-
cal dimension was not deeply investigated and 
sometimes individuals were ruthlessly dis-
carded in arrogant bureaucratic memoranda: 
"Not a trier"; "Weed, mentally and physical-
ly"; "Very bad type. Wilfully neglected stock 
and plant"; "Lazy and a drunkard." Yet the 
combat experience of the "failed" settlers as a 
group was probably fully representative of the 
Australian contribution to the cruel stupidities 
of Europe's war (Powell 1985). Additional local 
investigations may show that new social divi-
sions were created in this period in many small 
rural communities. Although that remains yet 
another unwritten chapter in the interpreta-
tion of settlers' adaptation on the plains, the 
lessons of the debacle did contribute to the 
success of similar schemes after 1945. 
Canada's federal program was markedly 
paternalistic, at least in the beginning, and 
showed some of the influence of U.S. progres-
sive rural sociology. Town-planning adviser 
Thomas Adams, who represented the British 
school of community planning, called unsuc-
cessfully for a "scientific organization" of the 
soldier settlement project to intensify existing 
settlement in established regions by means of 
compact, cooperative colonies and mixed 
Garden City-style estates. The Soldier Set-
tlement Board had different but ambitious 
aims, supervising the settlement process on 
about five million acres of the prairies. The 
hesitantly expanding work of the Home 
Branch provided a vital complement to the 
Board's hard-won expertise in financial admin-
istration and technical supervision, if only in 
its efforts to provide home management 
courses and the like to rescue the pioneer's wife 
from "a mental oasis on a prairie farm" (Powell 
1979, 1982a). The Adams-style community 
system was rejected in favor of old-style 
individualistic endeavors, yet by the end of the 
depression a 75 to 80 percent retenLion rate of 
soldier settlers was claimed for the prairie 
provinces. In fact, the Settlement Board was 
judged one of the more valuable institutional 
adaptations, and its responsibilities were subse-
quently extended. Not everyone was pleased, 
however. As in Australia, some observers 
feared that the settlement schemes were dan-
gerous departures from traditional capitalism, 
with the effect of shedding the healthy self-
reliance of the pioneers for a weak-willed 
dependence on the state. Like Australians, 
Canadians were unsure of their national 
ambitions; also like the Australians, many 
Canadians interpreted experience in terms of 
the lessons of pioneer settlement. The settlers 
did not want to be treated as guinea pigs or as 
chips in a game of chance. And, at least in 
some cases, the most abject "failures" by 
official description may have succeeded very 
well indeed by their own reckoning-they 
moved on, profiting financially and in farming 
experience. 
WATER AND ECONOMY: THE SUDAN 
In both Australia and Canada, the agricul-
tural settlement of semiarid lands was carried 
out by European-descended peoples who easily 
accommodated to British forms of govern-
ment. When settlement schemes were imposed 
by imperial policymakers on peoples with 
totally different cultural backgrounds, the 
problems involved in the projects were quite 
different, as we can see by turning to an 
African example. After the battle of Omdur-
man in 1898, the Sudan was made a 
condominium under Anglo-Egyptian control. 
The Sudan was the ward and Egypt very much 
the junior partner; it was therefore left to the 
British, as they saw it, to bring "civilization" to 
the Sudanese people (Gaitskell 1959). Sudan's 
traditional semi subsistence economy was 
based on peasant farming and nomadic pastor-
alism, offering only gum, hides and skins, 
ivory, and ostrich feathers for world markets. 
The British confidently declared that the 
Sudan's most pressing need was more British 
officials and rapid capital investment in rail-
ways and irrigation. The Gezira project, south 
of Khartoum between the Blue and White 
Niles, became the cornerstone of this great 
imperial adventure in an increasingly bu-
reaucratic and technocratic age, an age far 
more like our own than the popular images of 
governors' levees and tiger hunts suggest. 
The mysterious sources of the Nile were 
unknown to the Western world until the 
expeditions of Speke, Burton, Baker, and 
Stanley in the late nineteenth century. Less 
spectacular expeditions made by senior engi-
neers in the early twentieth century also 
frequently yielded valuable accounts of natural 
and social environments. Although these 
engineers failed to decipher the fascinating 
geohydrological history of the region, which is 
highly complex and crucial to an understand-
ing of intransigent management problems, 
including salting (cf. Williams and Adamson 
1982), the early engineering expeditions not 
only resulted in a gigantic project but also 
served as a remarkable training ground for 
imperial technocrats. With Indian, American, 
and Australian experience to draw upon, the 
Gezira scheme was multipurpose from its 
inception in 1904. Long staple cotton was to 
provide the economic base, but its cultivation 
entailed a complex conversion of the peasant 
farming communities and newly devised crop 
rotations to maximize productivity and mini-
mize soil losses and reductions in the quality 
and volume of water. Meanwhile, Egypt's 
ancient rights to the downstream flow had to 
be safeguarded. A novel partnership 
agreement was drawn up among the 
condominium government, a private manage-
ment syndicate with guaranteed connections 
in the Lancashire textile industry, and the 
tenant cultivators. Tenants held their land 
from the government, which in turn rented it 
from the original owners; food and fodder 
crops were retained by the tenants; the cotton 
crop was handed over to the management for 
marketing, the tenants retaining a share of the 
proceeds proportional to the amount of cotton 
they delivered. Paternalism did llot extend to 
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land nationalization, yet control was quite 
effectively ensured by restricting, not remov-
ing, traditional proprietorial rights. Similarly, 
since the government took on the rental for 
forty years there could be no immediate 
problem with incremental values; and finally, 
neither land nor crops could normally be used 
to secure mortgages or debts of any descrip-
tion. 
The Sennar dam supplied over 300,000 
acres of the Gezira. A regional research farm 
maintained a close liaison with the Empire 
Cotton Growing Association and Britain's 
Rothamsted Experimental Station; visiting 
consultants of the highest repute were brought 
to the Sudan, and a London Advisory Com-
mittee proffered regular critiques. The Gezira 
project represented the "trusteeship" strain of 
empire which aimed to build up the dynamic 
indigenous economy while ensuring that the 
new wealth was not concentrated into the 
hands of a favored few. The outstanding early 
technical successes of the project encouraged 
further expansions that were accelerated in the 
1950s, when the irrigated area grew to about 
two million acres. Income returned to the 
Gezira has indeed been widely distributed 
among a tenant population numbering more 
than 300,000 families, plus some 500,000 
seasonal laborers from West Africa and West-
tern Sudan. The tenants generally resisted the 
managers' efforts to place them on easily 
monitored individual blocks; the compromise 
was a fairly regular dispersal of villages, the 
peasants' preferred settlement form, at inter-
vals of two or three kilometers along the 
distributary canals. Schistosomiasis, already 
endemic in the Sudan, increased on the Gezira 
and remained a problem despite the treatment 
of infected canals with copper sulphate. 
Egypt's claims on the Nile were strengthened 
by an engineering-dominated agreement in 
1929, but the remaining uncertainties made 
diplomacy an additional water management 
skill. 
The trusteeship claim began to ring hollow 
in the interwar period and the unfinished 
history of the Gezira project still carries a 
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warning. The Gezira might have lanched a 
"Sudanization" process, but transfer of power 
did not occur until after World War II, 
precipitated by urgent local demands, interna-
tional affairs, and the revolution in Egypt in 
1952. The Gezira was also an early example of 
the kind of "growth pole" tactic favored by 
Western and communist planners alike, but its 
attraction for successive Sudanese govern-
ments exposed the one-eyed inefficiencies of 
the approach. The inheritance of regional 
inequality became oppressive in the postwar 
world, and was an immediate cause of rebel-
lions in the 1960s and 1970s when over one 
million people perished through famine, dis-
ease, and widespread violence (Roden 1974). In 
the wider context, the source-to-sea division of 
a single hydrological system between several 
independent nations was another unfortunate 
legacy of European imperialism. 
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 
Variety was the keynote of development in 
Africa's semiarid territories during the period 
between the world wars, and the Gezira IS 
more unique than representative; in fact it 
may be more realistic to evaluate it 
internationally, against other contemporary 
irrigation enterprises. Yet it contains impor-
tant commonalities central to much of the 
African experience in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Throughout Africa a 
deliberately increased emphasis on export 
crops accompanied the emergence of a highly 
dualistic agrarian economy, peasant and plan-
tation, or quasiplantation, side by side. The 
export-oriented enterprises benefited from the 
selection of soils and other natural conditions, 
sophisticated administrative and credit facili-
ties, agro-scientific expertise, and a highly 
capitalized infrastructure for storage, transpor-
tation, and marketing, while the peasant 
sector was often denied these advantages. The 
Gezira only partially escapes this censure 
because of the planned rotation of peasant-
plantation crops in a sequence designed essen-
tially to improve the commercial enterprise. 
The autonomous but unstable govern-
ments of today's Africa, hampered by the 
remnants of old structures of dependency, 
struggle to take their people into a new and 
more secure era. Interested in ensuring a 
steady labor supply for export commodities, 
colonial governments discriminated against 
Africa's peasant economies, particularly by the 
manipulation of food prices, thus largely 
preventing the peasants' rise to economic 
independence. Managers of the Gezira project 
cited idealism in their drive to prevent land 
amalgamation, but they also prevented the 
emergence of an intermediate commercial 
class-an ambiguous result. Indeed it is not 
hard to argue that colonialism led to the 
comparative atrophy of the indigenous food-
producing sector and to increased dependence 
on export crops throughout Africa, in spite of 
differing environments. African countries, still 
reliant on exports, continue to confront the 
problem. Yet the Western capitalism intro-
duced by the colonial powers is not the only 
economic intrusion. Tanzania's unsuccessful 
and mismanaged attempt to introduce agrari-
an socialism in the 1970s provides a counter 
example. Although bad weather undoubtedly 
contributed to a sharp decline in food produc-
tion, it was the reluctance of the peasants to 
accept collective villages that resulted in the 
policy's reversal. The Special Rural Devel-
opment Program in Kenya after independence 
brought social disruption in the wake of 
introducing a system of freehold titles into a 
traditional land system. Perhaps peasants have 
formed an "awkward class" everywhere, and 
not simply in orthodox Marxist theory (d. 
Shanin 1972; also Dias 1981, Hill 1982; and see 
Gonzales 1978). These examples also illustrate 
the marked resilience of the peasant mode of 
production. In all of them there was too much 
planning from above, too little patient consul-
tation with the local people, and far too little 
of what communities in the developed world 
now expect in the form of public participation. 
IRRIGATION IN AUSTRALIA 
The Gezira's political, scientific, and tech-
nological champions were fired, for one thing, 
by the threatened emergence of communism in 
the less developed world. Such concerns were 
voiced less often during the contemporaneous 
consolidation of similarly large government-
controlled schemes in Australia, where since 
the 1880s irrigation had been accepted as a 
small but integral part of a much vaunted 
"State Socialism." Modern Western observers 
accept irrigation as resource development 
investment-making deserts bloom in relative-
ly restricted but well selected localities-or as 
stabilizing rural production over much wider 
areas. For most New World countries the 
overriding appeal of the first of these alterna-
tives is undeniable. Public enthusiasm for 
irrigation in Australia soared after major 
droughts in the 1870s, 1890s, the early years of 
this century, 1911, and during World War II, 
but until recent decades the projects seldom 
focused on the second alternative. Australia's 
socialistic adaptations partly reflected the 
environmental naivete' and political strength 
of the nation's overwhelmingly urban commu-
nities, but were also dictated by the realization 
that enormous investments would be required 
to combat a demanding physical environment. 
Political theorists and progressives of various 
persuasions could choose fo see government 
intervention as appropriate to the times, and 
promising a more equitable distribution and 
effective use of scarce supplies. Thus a simple 
nationalism was woven through all the 
schemes for using Australia's land and water. 
Australian governments favored "inten-
sive" schemes of group settlement to benefit as 
many families as possible. New irrigation 
projects, frequently associated with closer 
settlement schemes in each state, were justified 
as maximizing opportunities for pioneer farm-
ers and providing increased security for the 
family farm. The imperial pattern is evident in 
both the preliminary design and in subsequent 
routine management, where it penetrated most 
areas of administrative, legislative, and techni-
cal practice. Western American experience was 
also highly influential. From the 1880s, water 
management in Australia had its share of 
visiting experts, but this was more than 
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balanced by local knowledge and by the early 
employment of an uncommonly productive 
variant of the overseas study tour. Lessons 
from Egypt, India, Italy, and the United States 
were carefully sifted and widely circulated. 
John Wesley Powell offered his views, and 
there was considerable interest in the advice 
received from the state engineers of California 
and Colorado. In the colony of Victoria the 
innovative riparian legislation that effectively 
nationalized all surface waters built on outside 
advice as well as upon tortuous mining liti-
gation of immigrant Californians in the 1850s 
and 1860s; it borrowed from administrative 
and legal initiatives in British India and from 
contemporary local enactments. 
Unfortunately, the Australians elected to 
rely solely upon superficial engineering per-
spectives in the construction of the irrigation 
works, instead of using their talented geologists 
to research the ancient geomorphological 
history of the riverine plains. This contempo-
rary preference for unidisciplinary approaches 
missed the practical significance of the geomor-
phological record to irrigators. The Murrum-
bidgee riverine district, for instance, has been 
shown to be a Pleistocene alluvial plain 
resembling the current plains of the Nile and 
bearing little relationship to today's rivers. The 
higher discharges and steeper gradients of its 
ancient streams enabled them to carry more 
sand and gravel than today's highly sinuous 
Murrumbidgee, in which silt and clay are 
predominant. Such detailed features profound-
ly affect drainage, irrigation, and crop yield, 
but were not well understood until the postwar 
diffusion of synthesizing land-type analyses 
developed in the United States at the end of 
the 1930s (Langford-Smith and Rutherford 
1966; Hudson 1936). 
The American connection was important, 
but movements were two-way. In 1907 the 
nomadic Elwood Mead left his position in the 
U.S. Office of Irrigation Investigations to take 
up his appointment as chairman of Victoria's 
State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. 
Still inspired by the dream of using irrigation 
as a lever for social reform (Pisani 1983; Powell 
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1976), Mead, over the next eight years, sup-
ported both "extensive" or partial irrigation to 
stabilize dry farming enterprises and intensive 
schemes of the closer settlement variety. 
Clearly he then favored the latter, and this 
preference led to an imbalance that strength-
ened after his departure from Victoria. Back in 
the U.S., Mead maintained his Australian 
interests (Powell 1982b) and acted in a lucra-
tive consultancy capacity from time to time. In 
1923 he investigated progress on the Murrum-
bidgee Irrigation Area (MIA) for the New 
South Wales government, emphasizing the 
need to integrate irrigated and nonirrigated 
areas by fattening sheep and other dry land 
stock on fodder crops, and particularly on 
specialized lucerne (alfalfa) farms, in the irri-
gated districts. At the time, Mead's advice fell 
on deaf ears. Rank and file settlers, historically 
as relevant in that region as the transplanted 
experts, were joined by broken miners from 
Broken Hill and by the equally troubled 
returned soldiers, and they eventually com-
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bined to Win concessions from the state 
government. 
IRRIGATORS AND POLITICS; AUSTRALIA 
By the late 1920s the several specialized 
experimental research stations in the MIA 
maintained close liaison with government 
scientists, but the absence of effective exten-
sion services handicapped the diffusion of 
findings on soils, salinization, and rotation 
systems. The continuing cooperative spirit 
among the settlers filled the gap. Four farmers 
joined the scientific advisory committee for the 
region in 1927; more farmers were appointed 
in 1938 and in the war years additional 
representatives were appointed from the Rural 
Bank, the Department of Agriculture, and the 
farmers' cooperative organizations. Another 
broad-based body, the Irrigation Research 
Extension Committee, included representa-
tives from the farmers' cooperatives after 1941 
and was further augmented from the Universi-
N 
FIG. 2. Major irrigation regions of southeastern Australia, showing principal rivers and average annual 
rainfall (in inches). The Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area, discussed in the text, is identified (MIA). 
ty of Sydney, the Soil Conservation Service, 
and elsewhere. The result was not only a well-
staffed headquarters circulating large quanti-
ties of information, supervising field days and 
group meetings, and coordinating hundreds of 
volunteers, but also an influential forum for 
the airing of farmers' grievances-the MIA's 
own "agricultural parliament." This example 
of regional enterprise lost its effectiveness 
during the 1950s, when it was swallowed up in 
the labyrinths of the New South Wales bu-
reaucracy. 
But flexibility is necessary for survival in an 
erratic climate and these novel adaptations in 
the MIA did not mitigate the rigidities com-
mon to closer settlement schemes dependent 
on irrigation. In Australia the engineer's 
passionate concern that all water be applied to 
maximum effect by every user normally led to 
the agencies' zealous insistence on intensive 
cultivation and an ostentatiously paternalistic 
control over the physical planning of the 
irrigation settlements. To some extent the 
emulation of MIA-style cooperation tempered 
this single-minded ness, but in general all 
parties were agreed that the intensive system 
was to be preferred. In Australia a way-of-life 
option was preferred to cool efficiency-a 
theme that many commentators continue to 
find exasperating and enviable. The main 
concessions won by the settlers involved 
protecting their individual stakes in the 
scheme, not challenging its fundamental as-
sumptions. Settlers were inclined to agree with 
a distinguished official arbitrator that it would 
be unreasonable to ask a pioneer farmer to 
accept an average income below that of a mere 
water bailiff. Contemporaries believed that the 
local communities had forced adaptations in 
the system: in review, the opposite effect could 
have been claimed with equal validity. Irriga-
tion is now regularly rejected by Australia's 
economists (e.g., Davidson 1969). 
The emergence of sectional tensions and 
the development of new farming frontiers 
remote from th~ settled fringes led to regional-
ist political movements. Irrigators, small wheat 
farmers, and wheat-and-sheep farmers alike 
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supported a fledgling anticentralist Country 
party that adroitly held the balance of power 
at federal and state levels for long periods 
during the interwar years. It was intimately 
associated with several very popular "new 
states" movements, and with secessionist inter-
ests in Western Australia and in the Riverina 
of New South Wales, where the MIA provided 
a strong nucleus. Much of the agitation was 
antiurban, demanding better rewards for those 
who claimed to be the real pioneers of Austra-
lia. The uncertainties incident to life in the 
semiarid plains, together with the wider cen-
ter-periphery tensions in the young nation, 
involved pioneer farmers in continuing politi-
cal and economic agitation. 
FAMILIES AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS 
The settlement margins of Argentina and 
Canada offer provocative contrasts to those of 
Australia. Wheat farming prospered on the 
large estates of the pampas, supported by 
phenomenal waves of immigration. Argentina 
was part of Britain's informal empire, but its 
immigration program was dominated by 
southern Europeans-most of all by millions of 
Italians, who were generally content to become 
laborers or tenant farmers and took little part 
in Argentinian politics (Solberg 1982). In 
contrast, except for Clifford Sifton's attempts 
to attract colonists from eastern Europe, 
Canada's restrIctIve immigration policies 
brought prairie settlers mainly from Britain, 
northern and western Europe, the United 
States, and the older provinces of Ontario, 
Quebec, and the Maritimes. Homesteading 
was the rule and popular participation in 
Canada's democratic politics an established 
tradition. Accordingly, strong agrarian 
movements developed to safeguard the inter-
ests of the peripheral region (Mackintosh 1924; 
Wood 1924; Morton 1934). The pampas was 
comparatively densely populated and this, 
together with its entrenched connections with 
the capital, guaranteed that there were few of 
the problems with industrial tariff protection 
that plagued wheat farmers on the plains of 
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North America and Australia. Argentine 
agriculture was therefore given a competitive 
edge by the lower costs of labor and imports, 
including farm machinery; in addition the 
tenant farmers, however poor their condition 
otherwise, were not burdened with heavy 
mortgages, and rentals were often reduced 
when agricultural prices followed a sustained 
decline (Solberg 1971). Climatic restrictions in 
the prairie provinces reduced opportunities for 
diversification from wheat, a favored strategy 
in Australia. In the 1930s the collapse of world 
prices and a succession of droughts bank-
rupted many prairie communities and, as in 
Australia, farmers sought government assis-
tance in the form of soil conservation pro-
grams, various types of loans and debt 
adjustments, wheat stabilization schemes, and 
the like. In Canada the old option was still 
being exercised to some extent-moving on to 
virgin country-but that had become less 
common in Australia's wheatlands. 
None of this says enough about the most 
valuable institution in any rural region, the 
family. Whether nuclear or extended, the 
family offered farmers all their props and most 
of their motivation, yet it is today often 
ignored or sentimentalized. Families allowed 
the pooling of labor, finances, knowledge, and 
emotional investment, so families often settled 
in earlier and survived when individual home-
steaders went to the wall. When they had to 
leave in mass regional emigrations, their plight 
was sung in literary classics of the 1930s. 
Building on more ancient traditions, Mikhail 
Sholokhov's Quiet Flows the Don and John 
Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath captured some of 
the essence of land-rootedness that Words-
worth had explained over a century earlier-
the land was CIa fountain fitted to the nature of 
social man from which supplies of affection 
... are daily drawn" (see Craig 1974; Jensen 
and Miller 1980). Many of the farmers of the 
Russian steppes and North China Plain were 
new to those regions, new to farming, and so 
the land did not symbolize the way of life of 
their ancestors. Families in the semiarid re-
gions of the New World were scarcely peasants 
in any Old World sense; even so, the territorial 
bond was obviously threatened, and it remains 
difficult for Australian and Canadian readers 
t~ understand why Steinbeck's migrants never 
organized. Is it true that American rural 
society remained stratified, that aid to the 
rural poor was less generous during the New 
Deal than it might have been? If so, are we 
merely dealing with a continuum, capitalist-
socialist, with the two British Dominions 
occupying central positions? It can't be that 
simple. 
Although there were collective adaptations 
on the Australian and Canadian plains that 
took the form of bold and durable expressions 
of regional identity, in order to understand 
them we need more methodical local analyses 
of the changes in family farm structures-in 
good oral history, in empathetic fiction like 
Grapes of Wrath, and in the kind of work in 
social anthropology that John Bennett and his 
associates have produced for Saskatchewan 
(Bennett 1982). As for the differences between 
the forms of rural protest in Australia and 
Canada, my tentative view is that the three 
adjacent prairie provinces offered an unusually 
extensive and homogenous base that was not 
matched in Australia, where similarly disaf-
fected communities were scattered around the 
desert heart, obliged to direct their venom at 
individual state authorities as well as the 
Commonwealth government. Agricultural ad-
justment and other government interventions 
in Australia and Canada are now long-estab-
lished elements of rural living. For the United 
States, Worster and others claim that the 
opportunities for fundamental social reform 
were not realized-neither in the administra-
tion of various relief measures nor in rural 
planning. The New Deal brought no new deal 
for the rural poor; rather it conserved and 
protected corporate capitalism by assisting 
those with greater political and economic 
muscle. In Australia and Canada some of the 
louder calls for reform came from organized 
rural groups. Admittedly, neither country 
boasts the volume of interdisciplinary research 
which has illuminated this period for the 
United States, yet there is enough to suggest 
that extremes of wealth and poverty were 
rather less apparent and that plains people had 
found ways of using their governments. The 
exceptions are Indians and aboriginals, the 
dispossessed, for most of whom Depression was 
the normal condition, environmental destruc-
tion a continuing tragedy. Forty years later, 
when these indigenous peoples at last devel-
oped their own protest movements, rural 
communities that had often displayed their 
own best skills in similar campaigns bitterly 
attacked native claims to unique land rights. 
CONCLUSION 
In all our examples, despite regional pro-
tests, control over agrarian economic policy 
remained outside the producing regions: 
whether wheat farmers, graziers, or irrigators, 
the peoples of the semiarid lands were depen-
dent upon decisions made in humid, 
industrializing fringes-which were in turn still 
peripheral to the metropolitan hearths. Don-
ald Worster identified with the last generation 
to find their dreams in American land, and 
described how an economic and ecological 
crisis left only "a cultural boneyard, where the 
evidence of bad judgment and misplaced 
schemes lie strewn about like bleached skulls" 
(Worster 1979,3). As a paradigm for environ-
mental history Worster's interpretation ex-
tends beyond his original specification of time 
and place, and the complex varieties of adapta-
tion on the world's semiarid plains reveal an 
interweaving of modern, traditional, socialist, 
and capitalist modes that the casual vocabu-
lary of "success" and "failure" obfuscates. The 
international perspective also discloses that 
any tight focus on plains areas alone-however 
convenient or dramatic that appears to be for 
committed ecological and literary schol-
arship-may prove fragile or even self-defeat-
ing. 
The mission of our teaching and research 
in the modern history of the world's semiarid 
lands requires us to communicate the sense of 
a profoundly significant community of interest 
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and a proper grasp of continuity. The reso-
nances of the interwar crises remain pervasive 
and beckoning. Those crises were at once 
environmental and social, political and admin-
istrative; parsimoniously set in any single 
national context they are oversimplified and 
even incomprehensible. It must be made clear 
that neither capitalism nor socialism nor any 
admixture of the two has provided a satisfying, 
ecologically adaptive culture. Over the past 
fifty years, reformers have tried to put their 
various houses in order (Sears 1937) with only 
limited success. Perhaps the indulgent frag-
mentations of academic discourse distort our 
perceptions, thereby compounding the very 
problems we address and reducing the' utility 
of our approaches for the wider community. 
We might do more to close the gap between 
our formal programs of teaching and research 
and the rich heritage of vernacular modes of 
inquiry. And our interpretations need not 
commence with economic ideologies in every 
case but with the experiences of actual settlers 
and with interdisciplinary sorties of pure and 
applied science: so we may have a science for 
citizenship, not for the scientist or for the sake 
of science itself; and today, more than ever 
before, it must not be designed solely for the 
kind of "nation planning" so dear to Griffith 
Taylor but rather for world citizenship. Only 
then, as Earth and Mankind intertwine in 
stressful coauthorship, can they produce a 
legible document for a sustainable future. 
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